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This study analyzes the relationship between market concentration and new 
product introductions using an extensive annual panel data set covering the period 1983 
to 2004 from the US processed food industry. We test the new theory, which argues that 
new product introductions are influenced by the anticipation of future mergers. The 
evidence suggests that market concentration increases new product introductions and 
product introductions spur subsequent mergers in the US processed food industry. Hence 
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  21. Introduction 
Wide range of product variety in consumer goods has become a hallmark of 
economic progress. The effect of market structure on product variety has drawn the 
attention of economists for a long time. In an extensive theoretical literature on the effect 
of market concentration on product variety, predictions are conflicting. The empirical 
evidence is sparse with little agreement across studies. In this study we analyze the effect 
of market concentration on product variety
1 using data from US processed food 
industries. We test a new theoretical prediction that provides an alternative explanation 
for the surge of new product introductions. Additionally, we employ an extensive annual 
panel data and account for potential endogeneity of market concentration that distinguish 
our study from the prior empirical studies on the US food industry 
 In the extant theoretical literature on market structure and product variety, one 
strand of models suggest that more competitive (less concentrated) industries introduce 
more new products as firms seek to create market niches in the product space, essentially 
eroding rents with a high degree of product variety (e.g., Salop, 1979; Raubitschek, 
1987). This theory views new product introduction as a competitive tool and predicts that 
market concentration is inversely related with product variety.   
Another theory argues that markets threatened by potential entry, incumbent firms 
introduce an increased variety of products that are close in product space in order to 
crowd the market (Schmalensee, 1978; Lancaster, 1979; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979). This 
conjecture, known as the ‘spatial preemption’ theory, thus implies that firms preempt 
                                                 
1 Product variety is a net result of product introductions and product failures i.e. Product variety = Existing 
products + New Product Introductions – Product Failures. Our study focuses on number of new product 
introductions (NPI). We assume that the NPI are proportional to the product variety, hence we can test the 
theoretical predictions of the models that are based on product variety.  
  3spatial entry by product proliferation that blocks profitable niches. In contrast a protected 
concentrated market can provide incentives for firms to restrict product variety in order to 
optimize the economies of scale. Hence the spatial preemption theory implies that a 
contestable market would introduce more new products than a protected concentrated 
market. This would again imply a negative relationship between market concentration 
and product variety.  Since, there is a tradeoff between gains from economies of scale and 
gains from serving consumers’ preference for variety, the welfare implications of the 




                                                
Innes (2006)
3 provides a new perspective about the product introduction decisions 
of firms and its relationship with market concentration. This theory argues that under a 
given antitrust regime (that defines the maximum permissible market concentration), 
where mergers determine the resulting market concentration, anticipation of merger and 
the consequent level of profit provide incentives for fringe firms to enter and introduce 
new products. Thus it implies a positive relationship between product variety and 
concentration as product introductions are expected to increase mergers that lead to 
increase in market concentration.  
 In sum, whether market concentration promotes or reduces product variety is an 
empirical question. However the empirical literature on this issue is scarce. Studies have 
been conducted to analyze the effect of market concentration on product introduction or 
product variety using data from the US food (Connor, 1981; Zellner, 1989; Roder, 
 
2 The evolution of the theoretical literature analyzing the implication of different market structures on 
product variety and their welfare implications are well summarized by Lancaster (1990). 
3 The main objective of the paper is to compare the flexible manufacturing versus inflexible manufacturing 
production process and analyze the welfare implications where anticipation of mergers influences the entry 
and product introduction decisions of the firms.  
  4Herrmann and Connor, 2000), radio-broadcasting (Berry & Waldfogel, 2001) and music 
industries (Alexander, 1997). These studies have yielded a variety of results. While some 
studies find that higher market concentration increases product variety, others show that 
higher concentration reduces product variety
4. Hence it is evident that there is little 
agreement in the empirical literature regarding the relation between market concentration 
and product variety.  
This disagreement could be attributed to differences in industry specific 
characteristics. Yet surprisingly, the results are varied even for studies on the same 
industry, the US food industry. This is more likely to be attributable to the data and 
methodological issues. We analyze these issues and address the potential problems in the 
empirical literature by estimating the effect of market concentration on new product 
introduction using an extensive annual panel dataset for the period 1983-2004 for US 
processed food industries while accounting for the endogeneity of market concentration. 
The US processed food industry has some special characteristics that provide an 
interesting avenue to explore the relationship between market concentration and product 
variety. A typical supermarket sells thousands of processed food products, several 
thousand new products are introduced every year, and the food processing industry is 
getting increasingly concentrated (Sexton, 2000)
 5. 
                                                 
4 Connor (1981), Zellner (1989) and Berry & Waldfogel (2001) depict a positive effect and Alexander 
(1997) and Roder, Herrmann & Connor (2000) find a negative effect of market concentration on product 
variety.  
5 www.fmi.org and Progressive Grocer’s 60
th Annual Report (1993) provides statistics on the number of 
processed food product carried by the supermarkets.  Figure 1 depicts the trend new product introductions. 
 
  52. Methodological Issues 
The theories on the effect of market concentration on product variety, discussed 
above, suggest that the new product introductions can either promote competition or deter 
spatial entry. Hence for the purpose of empirical estimation of the effect of market 
concentration on product variety, it implies that market concentration is endogenous as 
market concentration gets affected by product introductions. Empirical evidence also 
suggests endogeneity of market concentration as an explanatory variable for product 
introduction. Zellner’s (1989) study shows that new products introductions and market 
concentration have significant positive effects on each other in a simultaneous equations 
system
6. Geroski and Pomroy (1990) show that product variety affect the evolution of 
market concentration using data from UK manufacturing industries. Hence the empirical 
studies should test for potential endogeneity of market concentration while explaining 
product variety. Failure to account for the endogeneity of market concentration can 
produce biased results. With the exception of Zellner (1989), all the other studies on food 
industry treat market concentration as exogenous. 
The theories and the empirical evidence from Geroski and Pomroy’s (1990) study 
suggest a dynamic relationship between industry concentration and product variety. 
Hence a panel data set is more appropriate to analyze the interactive relation between 
these two variables of interest. Yet, all the empirical studies on the food industry, with the 
                                                 
6 This study on US food industry belongs to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) strand of literature 
and focuses on the use of advertising as a substitute strategic tool for new product introductions. The cross 
sectional analysis based on new products introductions data for 1977-78, used a simultaneous equations 
system with advertising intensity, price-cost margin, concentration, and new product introductions as 
jointly endogenous. 
 
  6exception of Roder, Herrmann & Connor (2000), examine the relationship using cross-
section data.  
We utilize an extensive annual panel data for the period 1983-2004 and account 
for endogeneity of market concentration. These features distinguish our study from the 
prior empirical work on the US food industry. Zellner (1989) accounted for endogeneity 
of market concentration but used cross section analysis. Roder, Herrmann and Connor 
(2000) study a panel of new product introductions in USA from 1988-1994. However, in 
this study, the potential endogeneity of concentration has not been accounted for and 
concentration measures for five years out of the seven-year study period are imputed 
using data from two years of Census of Manufacturers.  
In addition to addressing the methodological issues, we test the new theory of 
product introduction in anticipation of future mergers (Innes, 2006) by analyzing the 
impact of product introduction on subsequent mergers in the food industry. 
3. Data 
We use annual data on new product introductions (NPI hence forth) in the USA, 
classified by various categories of processed food
7. The data used in this study covers the 
period 1983 to 2004. The number of new product introductions have been used to proxy 
for product variety in the different segments of processed food industry in USA.  
The food processing companies, like other manufacturing companies, are 
classified by SIC codes to identify their industry segments
8. Using annual firm level data 
from Compustat, we compute annual industry level (identified by 4-digit SIC codes) 
                                                 
7 Data Source: Various issues of  ‘The Food Institute Report’ 
8 The detailed description of the SIC codes were obtained from  
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=13&tab=group   
 
  7measures on sales, capital expenditure, value of property plants and equipments and R&D 
expenditure. Compustat contains annual operating data on companies listed on the major 
US stock exchanges and it does not include the private (non-listed) companies. Since the 
publicly traded companies are the market leaders accounting for majority of market sales, 
R&D and capital expenditure, our measures of these variables may not be exhaustive, but 
they provide adequate aggregated industry level (represented by the various food 
categories presented in Table 1) measures that represent the heterogeneity across the 
different segments of the processed food industry, which we need for the purpose of this 
study. We match the industry data to different product categories corresponding to the 
new product introduction categories based on the SIC codes. We grouped some 
categories of food introductions together to be able to map them to the industry data. 
Large multi-product companies (such as Unilever and Nestle) that produce a large veriety 
of processed food posed a challenge for classification into specific segments of processed 
food industry. We used the annual reports of such companies to carefully allocate their 
financial data to different food categories based on the share of revenue coming from the 
different processed food segments.  
Using the annual sales data, we construct the following alternative market 
concentration measures that have been widely used in the literature
9:  
Herfindahl Index (HI):  H =  ∑ (si
2)    with  i=1,2,…..,N 
Four firm concentration index (CI4):  CI4 =  ∑ (si
2)    with i=1,2,3,4   where the 
firms are ranked in descending order of their market share. 
                                                 
9 Roder, Herrmann and Connor, 2000; Alexander, 1997; Zellner, 1989; Connor, 1981  
 
  8  Our final dataset comprises annual data on new product introductions, industry 
concentration indices, number of firms, sales, sales growth and capital intensity measures 
for nine segments (see Table 1) of the processed food industry for the twenty-two year 
period 1983 to 2004.
  
                                                
4. Empirical Estimation Strategy and Results 
A. The Effect of Market Concentration on New Product Introductions 
The first objective of the study is to analyze the effect of market concentration on 
new product introduction. Apart from market concentration, the prior empirical literature 
has used market size (sales), market growth (sales growth) and number of firms as 
important determinants of product introduction. We employ the following model to 
estimate the effect of market concentration on new product introduction: 
NPIit =  α +  β Cit  +  γ Xit  +  εit      
where  
NPIit =  new product introductions in the food industry i in year t 
Cit  = concentration index in food industry i in year t  
Xit   = exogenous variables that includes sales, sales growth, number of firms, R&D 
intensity
10, capital intensity in food industry i in year t; and time variant economy wide 
variables representing the demand factors like share of food expenditure in disposable 
income, proportion of food expenditure in incurred on food away from home. 
The above model is estimated with the two alternative measures of market 
concentrations – HI and CI4. We have two sets of estimates – one set treats the market 
 
10 The data on R&D expenditure available from Compustat is the total R&D expenditure that includes 
expenditure on both product and process R&D. Hence it is not the exact measure of R&D investment for 
product introduction.  
  9concentration as exogenous while the other allows the market concentration to be 
endogenous. 
Identification Strategy: We seek to identify market concentration with an 
instrument that is constructed by the interaction of total number of mergers in the US 
economy with segment specific capital asset intensity in processed food industry. The 
ratio of net property, plant and equipments to annual sales provides the measure of capital 
asset intensity that varies across the different segments of the processed food industry as 
well as over time. The US mergers represent a pure time series variable i.e. has only time 
variations and hence is expected to help in identifying the temporal variation. The capital 
asset intensity measure that varies across the processed food industry segments as well as 
time is expected to help in identifying temporal as well as cross-sectional variations in 
market concentration. Hence our instrumental variable, an interaction of a time variant 
variable with a cross-section cum time variant variable, is a potentially good instrument 
to identify market concentration in our panel data model. 
Since, merger waves in an economy affects mergers across all the sectors, hence 
we expect overall trend of mergers in the US economy to affect the mergers in the US 
processed food industry and hence the market concentration in the various segments as 
well. At a first glance one might expect this variable to get affected by NPIs as the 
anticipatory mergers theory argues that NPIs occur in anticipation of future mergers in 
the specific industry. However, the fact that the processed food industry is a very small 
proportion of the US economy, rules out the possibility of NPIs in food industry 
influencing overall mergers in the economy through its influence on mergers in the 
processed food industry.  Hence we can argue that aggregate US mergers can affect NPIs 
  10in food industry only through the channel of food industry market concentration. Turning 
to capital asset intensity, one might argue that capital intensity can affect NPI as a more 
capital intensive industry might facilitate incremental product introductions or a more 
capital intensive industry might be indicative of high cost of introducing new products.  
In either case, the premise that capital intensity can potentially influence NPI is addressed 
in our model by controlling for an annual measure of capital expenditure intensity 
(annual capital expenditure to sales ratio). This measure of capital intensity represents the 
annual (variable) expenditure to maintain the capital as opposed to the capital asset 
intensity that represents investments in capital (fixed) assets that acts as barrier to entry 
and hence influences market concentration. Hence controlling for the capital expenditure 
intensity controls for the channel through which capital asset intensity can have any 
influence on NPI and thus capital asset intensity can be used as a component of the 
instrument for market concentration.  
Results: We assess the strength of the instrument(s) using the F test in the first 
stage regression of concentration index on all exogenous variables in our model. As 
reported in table 4a, the magnitudes of the test statistic are greater than 10
11, which imply 
that instrument(s) perform very well in explaining market concentration.  
The test for first order auto-correlation (Table 4b) revealed the existence of serial 
correlation. Table 4c presents the fixed effect estimates for models with exogenous as 
well as endogenous treatment of concentrations where the estimation procedures account 
                                                 
11A good instrument is expected to have F statistic of 10 or higher in the first stage as the weak instrument 
bias (1/1-F) is an inverse function of the F statistic and an acceptable benchmark of this weak instrument 
bias is approximately10% or less. 
  11for non-spherical disturbances. The models with exogenous and endogenous 
concentration have been estimated by GLS and GMM methods respectively
12. 
The results indicate that the market concentration increases product introductions. 
One percent increase in HI (CI4) leads to approximately 1.5 (1.3) percent increase in 
NPI.  The estimates also depict that number of firms and R&D intensity increase new 
product introductions. The result that market concentration has a positive effect on new 
product introductions provides evidence in support of the anticipatory mergers theory. 
We proceed to test the channel through which this positive effect comes into play i.e. the 
effect of NPIs on subsequent mergers. 
B. Testing the Anticipatory Mergers Theory 
Using annual data on number of mergers in the processed food industry we test 
the hypothesis that NPI spurs subsequent mergers. This analysis covers the period 1991 
to 2004
13. Due to data limited data availability, the mergers analysis covers a subset of 
the time frame covered by the NPI analysis. This analysis is conducted using aggregated 
processed food industry data as well as data classified by various food segments. The 
classification of different food segments is also different for this part of the analysis as 
the classification of mergers data was different from the classification for NPI data 
available to us. The large number of mergers specified under diversified food categories 
posed a difficult problem for matching them adequately with the NPI categories. The 
                                                 
12 The models with exogenous concentration have been estimated using ‘xtgls’ procedure in Stata taking 
into account panel level serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The models with endogenous 
concentration have been estimated by two step GMM estimation procedure using the ‘gmm’ option with 
‘xtivreg2’ in Stata that accounts for the endogeneity of concentration and adjusts for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation as well as. 
13 Data Source: Various issues of ‘The Food Institute Report’.  Due to data limited data availability, the 
mergers analysis covers a subset of the time frame covered by the NPI analysis. 
  12classifications used for the panel mergers analysis are specified in table 5b.
14 The 
following model specification was used to test the effect of lagged NPIs on mergers.  
 Mergersit =  α +  β  NPIi,t-k+  δ  X  +  εt      
where  the subscript i denotes the aggregate food industry for the aggregate analysis and 
food industry segment i for the panel analysis. 
Mergersit  : Number of mergers in the USA food processing industry i in the year t 
NPIi,t-k  : Number of new product introductions in the USA food processing industry i in 
the year t-k.  
X:  contains different combinations of the following variables 
-  total number of mergers in the US economy
15 in the year t,  
-  number of firms in the food industry i in the year t-k. 
-  sales growth in the food industry i in the year t-k.  
We tried sixteen variations of the model using different combinations of the above 
variables. We tried alternate values of k ranging between 1 and 7. 
Results: The results of the aggregate analysis and the grouped analysis are 
presented in Table 6A and 6B respectively. The tests for autocorrelation do not reject the 
null of no serial correlation. The results correspond to OLS estimates for the aggregate 
models. In case of the panel analysis, the number of mergers is very small in several 
cases. Count data models can better handle the discrete nature of the dependent variable 
with small values. Hence we used Poisson estimation for the panel analysis of mergers. 
                                                 
14 This classification excludes the diversified mergers category. Hence it does not incorporate all the 
mergers that are included in the aggregate analysis. We attempted to allocate the diversified category of 
mergers to the categories corresponding to the NPIs based on the sales information of diversified (SIC 
2000) firms. The adhoc allocation method did not yield any significant results. Since we do not have very 
strong faith in the allocation criteria we have refrained from presenting those results here. 
15 Data Source: Mergerstat Review 
 
  13We performed the linear as well as negative binomial estimations for these models. The 
results were qualitatively similar
16. Table 6B presents the random effects estimates for 
the panel data models as the Hausman statistic for FE vs RE failed to reject the null, 
indicating that random effects estimates are consistent and more efficient.  
The estimates indicate that the NPI with lag 3 and 4 have statistically significant 
positive effect on mergers. This result is consistent across all the model specifications. 
According to the aggregate analysis a one percent increase in NPIs can increase mergers 
between 0.92 and 1.3 percent. The corresponding elasticity for the panel estimates ranges 
between 0.06 and 0.16. Thus the mergers analysis reveals that new product introductions 
positively affect subsequent mergers in the food industry. Hence it provides evidence in 
support of the mechanism through which the anticipatory mergers theory predicts a 
positive relationship between NPIs and market concentration. 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides important insight into the testing of theoretical predictions 
about the relationship between market concentration and product variety. The analysis 
highlights the fact that accounting for the endogeneity of market concentration plays a 
vital role in estimating the effect of market concentration on new product introductions. 
Our analysis based on the data of the food industry suggests that market concentration 
increases product introductions
17. Number of firms and R&D intensity are also important 
factors that positively affect new product introductions. We also find that product 
                                                 
16 In case of negative binomial, convergence could not be achieved in some of the model specifications and 
in case of the linear estimations the NPI lags were not significant for the last two models. 
17 The number of new product introductions cannot distinguish between the quality of innovation i.e. 
improvement of a base product vis -a- vis a new base product.  Hence in order to infer about the quality of 
innovation from this study, one will need to assume that there is one to one mapping between number of 
new product introductions and quality of innovations. 
  14introductions spur subsequent mergers in the food industry. Hence positive relationship 
between market concentration and product introductions and positive effect of new 
product introductions on subsequent mergers provide evidence in support of the 
anticipatory mergers theory. Based on data compiled from various issues of ‘The Food 
Institute Report’ we found that new product introductions in the food industry are 
predominantly attributed to smaller firms as the top 20 firms introduced on an average 
about 15 percent of the total number of annual new products during the period 1999 to 
2002 while the top 4 firms introduced only 5 percent of the new products. This anecdotal 
evidence further strengthens our conclusion that product introduction occurs in 
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  16Table 1: Description of New Products Introductions (NPI) Categories 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NPI Category       |   Description 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        1     |   Processed Meat, Fish, Egg  
        2     |   Dairy Products 
        3     |   Desserts and Ice cream 
        4     |   Fruits and Vegetable Products, Condiments 
        5     |   Breakfast Cereals, Pet food 
        6     |   Bakery Food 
        7     |   Sugar, Confectionary, Snacks 
        8     |   Beverages 
        9     |   Meals, Side dishes 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2: Description of Variables 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable name |        Description 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         NPI  | Number of New Product Introductions 
          HI  | Herfindahl Index 
         CI4  | Four Firm Herfindahl Index 
           N  | Total number of firms 
       SALES  | Annual Sales ($ mn) 
         SGR  | Annual Sales Growth Rate 
      RNDI  | Annual R&D expenditure to sales ratio    
    CAPEXI  | Annual capital expenditure to sales ratio 
     CAPASI  | Net Plant, Property and Equipment to sales ratio 
     MERGERS  | Number of Mergers in the processed food industry 
   USMERGERS  | Number of Mergers in the USA 
  FEXP  | Food expenditure (% of disposable income) 




Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Panel Data Set 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------     
    Variable |   Obs     Mean      Std.Dev.     Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         NPI |   198    1177.641    908.8555     37         4596 
          HI |   198    0.248909    0.1199457    0.0718771  0.5194755 
         CI4 |   198    0.238468    0.1276649    0.027378   0.5177338 
           N |   198    18.89899    11.70188     5          65 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       SALES |   198    38281.54    32820.93     3265.568   195150.1 
         SGR |   198    5.627515    18.91088    -47.74893   150.643 
        RNDI |   198    0.006747    0.0043447    0      0.017762     
      CAPEXI |   198    0.0470237   0.0159381    0.0166153  0.1365205 
      CAPASI |   198    0.2684069   0.0710748    0.0839517  0.3821605 
   USMERGERS |   198    4882.909    2877.563     1877       9783 
 FEXP  |   198    10.69318    0.806914     9.45       12.46  
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Table 4a.  Results from First-Stage Regressions 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  (1)     (2)    
Endogenous Explanatory Variable -    HI        CI4     
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
coeff of [CAPASI*USMERGERS]       -0.0000489       -0.0000532 
               (0.000)    (0.000) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F stats for Instrument         21.78      21.87 
    (0.0000)    (0.0000)   
 
Partial R-sq for Instrument     0.1080      0.1083 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4b.  Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model with  -    HI     CI4 
Test Stat     40.874  39.790 
            (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4c. New Product Introductions (NPI) Regressions 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Concentration is exogenous    |  Concentration is endogenous   
 (1)    (2)       |   (3)    (4)     
     GLS    GMM       |    GLS   GMM     
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
HI   407.8791**     7,155.6489**  
  (0.041)     (0.017)   
CI4     443.4380**     6,530.2582** 
    (0.022)     (0.016) 
SALES   0.0052***  0.0053***   0.0055 0.0058 
  (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.128)  (0.106) 
SGR   0.5845 0.5887  -0.6607  -0.7189 
  (0.198)  (0.195)   (0.742)  (0.719) 
N    10.0211*** 10.1839***   19.5874  17.9264 
  (0.006)  (0.005)   (0.125)  (0.140) 
RNDI    26,594*** 26,208***   116,435***  114,322*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
FEXP    -52.6849 -54.3954   247.5589 240.1791 
  (0.521)  (0.504)   (0.272)  (0.278) 
FAFH    20.8455 20.5176   81.7665 80.4992 
  (0.462)  (0.465)   (0.382)  (0.380) 
CAPI   -498   -501    -5,662 -5,190 
    (0.484) (0.486)   (0.307) (0.333)  
Constant  0.7234    44.1283    
  (1.000)     (0.981)    
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of Observations = 198; Number of NPI categories = 9   
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%; GLS and GMM estimates obtained using xtgls and 
xtivreg2 in Stata, account for first order serial correlation.Figure 1 
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Table 5a. Summary Statistics of the Aggregate Data Set for Mergers 
Analysis 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     MERGERS |        14    171.3571    48.00418        107        259 
   USMERGERS |        14    6234.357    2902.305       1877       9783 
           N |        14    166.2857     25.5717        112        202 
         NPI |        14    13836.07    2881.003      10250      18982 




Table 5b. Description of Food Industry Categories for Mergers Analysis 
using Panel Data 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NPI Category       |   Description 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        1     |   Processed Meat, Fish, Egg  
        2&3    |   Dairy Products  
        4     |   Fruits and Vegetable Products (from 1999) 
        6     |   Bakery Food 
        7     |   Sugar, Confectionary, Snacks 






Table 5c. Summary Statistics of the Panel Data Set for Mergers Analysis 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     MERGERS |        76    16.30263    7.867265          2         35 
           N |        76    23.47368    15.32447          8         65 
         NPI |        76    1643.605    737.2679        453       3619 




  20Table 6. Mergers Regressions  
 
A. Aggregate Mergers Analysis (OLS estimates) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
    MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NPILAG3  0.015     0.016     0.015     0.013   
  (4.95)***    (4.88)***    (4.44)***    (4.61)***   
NPILAG4    0.013     0.018     0.016     0.012 
    (4.24)***    (5.70)***    (5.60)***    (3.99)*** 
USMERGERS      -0.002 -0.008     
      (0.78) (2.57)**      
NLAG3           -0.054    
          (0.14)    
NLAG4             -0.828   
            (2.44)**    
SGRLAG3              2.642   
              (1.92)* 
SGRLAG4                3.403 
                (1.44) 
CONSTANT  -19.370 0.549    -14.565 -9.111  -12.713 100.597 -9.236  -4.684 
  (0.49) (0.01) (0.36) (0.27) (0.20) (1.88)*  (0.26) (0.12)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elasticity  1.113   .997   1.168   1.334   1.126   1.215   .986   .921 
    (4.83)*** (4.15)*** (4.76)*** (5.55)*** (4.35)*** (5.46)*** (4.53)*** (3.92)*** 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations    14   14   14   14   14   14   14   14 
R-squared      0.67 0.60   0.69   0.75   0.67   0.74   0.75   0.66 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation  
(H0: no serial correlation) 
LM stats  1.615   4.997   1.250   0.891   1.541   1.410   0.680   3.682 
p-value  0.2038 0.0254 0.2635 0.3451 0.2144 0.2350 0.4096 0.0550 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16) 
    MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NPILAG3  0.015     0.013     0.013     0.013   
  (4.46)***    (3.67)***    (3.79)***    (3.50)***   
NPILAG4    0.018     0.017     0.015     0.017 
    (5.21)***    (4.61)***    (4.78)***    (4.18)*** 
NLAG3   0.748         0.140     0.229   
  (1.03)       (0.39)   (0.28)  
NLAG4     -0.333       -0.721   -0.357 
    (0.46)       (1.90)*    (0.47) 
USMERGERS  -0.007 -0.005 0.001   -0.007     -0.001 -0.004 
  (1.29) (0.77) (0.29) (1.93)*      (0.12) (0.56) 
SGRLAG3      2.940     2.809     2.628   
      (1.66)*    (1.87)*    (1.20)  
SGRLAG4        1.089     1.619     1.173 
        (0.45)   (0.70)   (0.46) 
CONSTANT  -96.700 34.407  -10.116 -9.794  -25.968 85.159  -35.753 36.917 
  (1.08) (0.34) (0.27) (0.28) (0.46) (1.44) (0.35) (0.35) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elasticity  1.101   1.307   .949   1.276   .943   1.151   .959   1.241 
    (4.37)*** (5.09)*** (3.63)*** (4.53)*** (3.74)*** (4.69)*** (3.46)*** (4.11)*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations    14   14   14   14   14   14   14   14 
R-squared  0.72   0.76   0.76   0.75   0.76   0.75   0.76   0.76 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation (H0: no serial correlation) 
LM stats  0.797   1.067   0.706   0.803    0.721   1.026   0.731    0.921    
p-value  0.3721 0.3016 0.4007 0.3703 0.3959 0.3110 0.3925 0.3372 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 
i. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   
ii. Elasticity denotes elasticity of mergers with respect to NPI lag evaluated at their sample means. 
 
 
  22B. Merger Analysis using Panel Data (Poisson Estimation) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
    MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
npilag3  0.0003   0.0003   0.0002   0.0003  
  (4.24)***    (3.53)***    (2.59)***    (3.85)***   
npilag4    0.0002   0.0002   0.0002   0.0002 
    (4.25)***    (3.39)***    (3.00)***    (3.76)*** 
usmergers      0.00002  0.0002     
      (1.61) (1.26)     
nlag3           0.0202    
          (4.25)*** 
nlag4             0.0136   
            (3.16)*** 
sgrlag3              0.0061  
              (3.30)***   
sgrlag4                0.0061 
                (2.85)*** 
Constant  2.3685 2.4303 2.2986 2.3801 2.0427 2.1959 2.3958 2.4523 
    (13.60)*** (15.34)*** (13.05)*** (14.84)*** (10.82)*** (13.27)*** (14.30)*** (16.35)***  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elasticity  0.1574   0.1320 0.1379 0.1148 0.0998 0.0969 0.1412 0.1154 
            (4.14)***  (4.14)*** (3.48)*** (3.34)*** (2.56)*** (2.96)*** (3.77)*** (3.68)*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations    76   76   76   76   76   76   76   76 
Categories     6     6     6     6     6     6     6     6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F stats  |   0.052  0.255   0.025   0.194   0.070   0.443   0.020   0.122 




  23------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16) 
    MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS MERGERS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NPILAG3  0.0002   0.0002   0.0002   0.0001  
  (2.41)**    (2.83)***    (2.29)**    (1.92)*   
NPILAG4    0.0002   0.0002   0.0001   0.0001 
    (2.64)***    (2.75)***    (2.52)**    (2.06)** 
NLAG3   0.0195       0.0193   0.0174  
  (3.97)***        (4.07)***    (3.56)***   
NLAG4     0.0130       0.0140   0.0131 
    (2.95)***        (3.29)***    (3.00)*** 
USMERGERS  0.00001  0.00001  0.00003  0.0002     0.00002  0.00001 
  (0.54) (0.57) (2.40)**  (1.63)     (1.29) (0.92) 
SGRLAG3      0.0069   0.0058   0.0063  
      (3.74)***    (3.09)***    (3.31)***   
SGRLAG4        0.0064   0.0065   0.0067 
        (3.03)***    (3.00)***    (3.09)*** 
CONSTANT  2.0290 2.1823 2.2930 2.3888 2.0843 2.2092 2.0545 2.1878 
    (10.73)*** (13.16)*** (13.73)*** (15.78)*** (11.30)*** (13.85)*** (11.31)*** (13.75)*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elasticity  0.0952 0.0905 0.1096 0.0922 0.0874 0.0799 0.0751 0.0692 
    (2.39)**  (2.62)*** (2.80)*** (2.72)*** (2.27)**  (2.49)**  (1.91)*  (2.05)** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations    76   76   76   76   76   76   76   76 
Categories     6     6     6     6     6     6     6     6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F stats  | 0.055    0.385   0.000   0.061   0.029   0.267   0.011   0.179 
P  value    |0.8233   0.5620 0.9871 0.8148 0.8720 0.6273 0.9207 0.6894 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 
i. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   
ii. The results are for random effects model.   
iii. Elasticity denotes elasticity of mergers with respect to NPI lag evaluated at their sample means. 
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